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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FRED SWEDIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

CASE NO,
15935

DEAN WALL,
Defendant-Respondent,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed a civil action against defendant for
recovery of certain sums of money due and owing.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff
on plaintiff's complaint and judgment by default was rendered
in favor of defendant on defendant's counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment by default
entered on respondent's counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 17, 1976, plaintiff filed the instant cause
of action against defendant for various sums owing which
totaled $2,251.60 plus interest.
On January 10, 1977, defendant filed an answer denying
plaintiff's allegations and claiming to reserve the right to
file a counterclaim against plaintiff.
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on March 23, 1977, plaintiff filed a request for
admissions and served same on defendant.

Defendant responded

to said requests on May 27, 1977, beyond the 30-day period
required for such response.
On June 3, 1977, defendant filed a counterclaim against
plaintiff, nearly six months after defendant filed his answer.
Leave of court was not obtained by defendant to file said
counterclaim after such a lapse of time.
On March 6, 1978, plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment based on defendant's failure to file a timely response
to plaintiff's request for admissions.

The hearing on the moti

was continued to time of trial on stipulation by counsel.
At the outset of the trial on May 9, 1978, plaintiff
renewed his

"1::::1: _ -:c:·

c,_)r

summary judgment which was granted by

the trial judge for the sum of $1,723.60.
The evening before trial, counsel for plaintiff discovered he had not filed a reply to defendant's counterclaim.
He then prepared a reply and served a copy thereof on counsel
for defendant just prior to trial.

Until that time, counsel

for defendant was unaware that no reply had been filed.
After plaintiff's summary judgment was granted, counsel
for defendant requested the court to enter the default of
plaintiff, there being no reply to the counterclaim.
Plaintiff's counsel informed the court he had a reply
prepared and ready for filing and that counsel for defendant
did not discover the omission until informed by plaintiff's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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counsel and had not filed a default certificate.
The Court granted a default judgment against plaintiff
for the sum of $930.30 which was set off against plaintiff's
summary judgment, resulting in a net judgment for plaintiff
of $793.30.
Plaintiff then filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment which was denied on June 15, 1978.
Plaintiff has appealed from the granting of default
judgment and defendant has cross-appealed from the summary
judgment for plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST PLAINTIFF
ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Ordinarily, the filing of pleadings outside the time
allowed by the rules of procedure is left to the discretion
of the trial court.

However, where prejudice results from a

court's ruling on filing of pleadings, the court's action
constitutes reversible error.

Taylor v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.

Co., 61 Utah 524, 216 P.239 (1923).
In Taylor, supra, the trial court permitted plaintiff,
under a former statute, to file a reply to defendant's answer
at the commencement of the trial and beyond the time allotted
for replying.

In affirming judgment for plaintiff, the Supreme

Court of Utah stated:
Appellant predicates error
on account of the filing of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitizationfor
provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
reply.
No motion
continuance
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

was made by defendant, and no
injury whatever is shown to have
been suffered by defendant on
account of the filing of the reply.
The filing of pleadings out of time
is generally a matter of discretion
with the trial court, and when, as
in this case, it does not appear
that the opposite party is prejudiced,
there is no error in permitting it.
216 P. at 240.
In the instant case, appellant's counsel had a reply
prepared and ready to submit at the outset of the trial.

Clear.

the allowing of the reply to be filed by the Court would not ha
prejudiced respondent in any way.

Respondent would still have

been able to present evidence in support of his counterclaim

~

to rebut appellant's reply.
However, appellant clearly suffered prejudice due to tt
court's granting o=

~espondent's

motion for default judgment.

Appellant was foreclosed from presenting any evidence to rebut
the allegations of respondent's counterclaim, resulting in a
substantial reduction of plaintiff's award.
Further, in this instance counsel for respondent was
unaware that no reply had been filed until so informed by coun:
for appellant.

No certificate of default had been filed by

respondent.
Quoting from the trial transcript at pages 88-89 of
the record herein:

Mr. FANKHAUSER: Your Honor, I'd
like to enter default to the plaintiff's
counterclaim, there being no reply thereto
at this point, and there being none of
record; therefore, we'd ask judgment on
the counterclaim.
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THE COURT:
in the file.

There is no reply filed

MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, it occurred
to me last night as I prepared the file
that the reply to the counterclaim has
not been made.
I prepared it; I have ~here this
morning. Mr. Fankhauser was not aware
that no reply had been filed until I
told him just to advise him, and now
he seeks to gain some advantage by that,
I think the Court ought to receive the
reply to the counterclaim at this time,
since we didn't have adequate notice
for his motion for default, since he
doesn't have a default certificate
prepared; and therefore, I think the
reply to the counterclaim ought to be
received.
The ruling of the trial court in granting default judgment permitted respondent's counsel to take advantage of his own
inadvertence or neglect inasmuch as he was not aware of the lack
of a reply until so informed by appellant's attorney.
Further, it may be argued that counsel for appellant had
no duty to file a reply to respondent's counterclaim.

Respondent's

counsel claimed in his answer he was "reserving" the right to
file a counterclaim.

There is no provision in the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure for such without first seeking leave of court.
Rule 13(a), U.R.C.P., states in part:
A pleading shall state as a
counterclaim any cla~m wh~ch at the time
of serving the plead~ng the pleader
has aga~nst any opposing party, if
it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter
of the opposing party's claim ..•.
(emphasis added)
At least as to respondent's counterclaims for labor
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those claims coincide in time and nature with appellant's
fourth and fifth claims for relief.

Consequently, they were

compulsory counterclaims which must have been filed at the time
the answer was filed unless respondent sought leave of court to
file at a later time.
Since the answer when filed contained no counterclaim,
the pleading designated as a counterclaim and filed six months
after the answer amounted to an amendment of the answer,
Appellant was not required to reply to the original answer sine
it contained no counterclaim.

Thus, pursuant to Rule 15(a),

U.R.C.P., respondent must have first sought leave of court to
file an amended pleading to include claims against appellant,
whether

compulso~y

or permissive.
POINT II

DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT WAS ERROR.
The general rule is that courts do not favor default
judgments.

Utah Commercial & Sav. Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198,

53 P, 1033 (1898).
In the instant case, appellant was present at trial witt
his attorney who had a reply in hand and ready to file.
Consequently, it may be argued that, under Rule 55(a) (1} ,~
appellant was nttin default so as to justify granting judgment
respondent's counterclaim.
If it be construed that a reply must in fact have been
filed prior to trial, then appellant is still afforded relief
by virtue of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., which reads in part:
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On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may in
furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order or
proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect;
Certainly, under the facts of the instant case, appellant's
counsel failed to file a reply due to inadvertence or excusable
neglect.

The counterclaim was not filed until six months after

the answer and, in fact, after appellant had served, and respondent
had answered, a number of interrogatories and requests for
production.

It is not surprising that counsel for appellant was

not monitoring carefully the proposed counterclaim.
The denial of the motion to set aside default was an
abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The purpose of the rules

of pleading are to promote justice, not the dogged adherence to
procedural rules.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, appellant urges this Court to
reverse the judgment of the lower court.
DATED this~~ay of September, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Att

ey for Appellant
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